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Abstract We assess the organizational culture in the
finance industry in relation to the global financial crisis and
consider the potential of cultural change to improve the
financial sector. To avoid (response) biases, we build on
the person–organization fit literature and develop a novel,
indirect method for assessing organizational culture that
revolves around relationships between employees’ personal
traits and their career success in the industry or organiza-
tion under study. We analyze personal values concerning
the pursuit of private gain (self-enhancement values) ver-
sus personal values concerning caring for others (self-
transcendence values) and consider whether employees
that value self-enhancement more and self-transcendence
less enjoy more career success relative to their peers when
working in finance than when working in other industries.
Results do not reveal any sort of cross-industry differences
that would implicate the finance industry’s culture in the
financial crisis. Instead, we find the opposite, namely that
strong self-enhancement values and weak self-transcen-
dence values go together with less career success in the
finance industry compared to other industries. Hence, if
anything, the culture in the finance industry does not seem
to resonate well with professionals that seek to pursue
personal gain at the expense of clients’ welfare. Implica-
tion is that cultural change has little potential to improve
the financial system. Meanwhile, the method for assessing
organizational culture indirectly by analyzing relationships
between employees’ traits and their career outcomes has
wider applicability, particularly when relying on scores or
measures obtained directly from the people concerned is
likely to render biased evidence.
Keywords Organizational culture  Financial crisis 
Personal values  Employee outcomes  P–O fit  Cultural
change
Introduction
With the financial sector playing a central role in the daily
lives of individuals and organizations alike (Krippner
2005; Davis and Kim 2015), a key question following the
global financial crisis (GFC) is how the financial system
can be improved to decrease the likelihood of future crises
and optimize the intermediation between suppliers of credit
and credit seekers. This paper assesses the finance indus-
try’s culture in relation to the GFC and considers the
potential of cultural change to improve the financial sector.
Corporate or organizational culture, which we define
straightforwardly as ‘‘the way we do things around here’’
(Bower 1966; Deal and Kennedy 1982), is widely recog-
nized as an essential feature of the organizational envi-
ronment, having strong effects on employees and their
behavior (Pettigrew 1979; Schein 1992). Hence, it is only
logical that the culture in the finance industry has been
fiercely debated in the wake of the financial crisis. Pro-
fessional commentators (Fox 2010; Lewis 2010; Friedman
2011), government officials (Stiglitz et al. 2010; Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011) as well as academics
(Boddy 2011; Santoro and Strauss 2012; Werner 2014)
have been particularly concerned with the role of the
finance industry’s culture in promoting unethical behavior
such as misleading customers, deliberately withholding
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information from clients and maximizing personal gain by
putting the welfare of others at risk and other such
malfeasances (ibidem). A study of laboratory behavior
reports that bankers do not behave statistically significantly
more dishonestly than other people do (Cohn et al. 2014),
while other work finds that the personal values of finance
professionals differ only trivially from the personal values
of other people (Van Hoorn 2015). Meanwhile, systematic
evidence on the actual organizational culture in the finance
industry is lacking, although the quasi-experimental study
by Cohn et al. (2014) does find that asking bankers about
their professional background increases their dishonesty. A
particular challenge is that the widespread criticism that the
industry’s culture has received in the wake of the crisis
leads to all sorts of biases in information collected directly
from the people concerned, professionals working in the
finance industry. If we take the typical approach to mea-
suring organizational culture, for instance, which is
through employee questionnaires (Ashkanasy et al. 2000),
we expect substantial biases in responses collected after the
start of the GFC that are aggravated by the fact that peo-
ple’s ethical values are involved (Zerbe and Paulhus 1987;
Randall and Fernandes 1991; Crane 1999). On the other
hand, widely discussed cases of malfeasance mostly con-
cern specific individuals and their behavior—Kweku
Adoboli and Je´roˆme Kerviel are high-profile examples
(Slater 2011)—rather than the actual culture of the orga-
nizations involved. Meanwhile, knowing the significance
of the industry’s culture as a factor in the GFC is critical to
the formulation of effective financial sector reforms, pre-
venting either an under- or overemphasizing of cultural
change as a way to improve the current financial system
(Central Bank of Ireland 2012; Financial Conduct
Authority 2014).
Seeking to present an unbiased yet systematic assess-
ment of the finance industry’s culture in relation to the
GFC, this paper develops an indirect method for assessing
organizational culture that revolves around observing
specific relationships between employee variables within
the organization (or industry) under study. The idea, which
has theoretical roots in the literature on person–organiza-
tion (P–O) fit (O’Reilly et al. 1991; Kristof 1996), is simply
that uncovering the personal traits that help or hamper
employees achieve success in particular organizations is
revealing of the organizational environments in these
organizations, particularly their cultures.
For the practical implementation of this indirect method
for assessing organizational culture, we consider individ-
uals’ personal values and their career success relative to
their peers working in the same industry, notably their
position in the corporate hierarchy. We compare the val-
ues–success relationship found for the finance industry
with the values–success relationship found for other
industries and look for cross-industry differences in this
relationship that are consistent with the idea that the culture
in the finance industry provides a better fit for employees
willing to engage in unethical behavior than other indus-
tries do. Concretely, we focus on a specific set of basic
human values (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987; Schwartz 1992),
namely so-called self-enhancement values (the values
associated with power, achievement, and the pursuit of
personal gain) versus so-called self-transcendence values
(the values associated with universalism, benevolence, and
caring about other people’s welfare). If the organizational
culture in the finance industry is indeed unique and partly
to blame for promoting the kind of malfeasances that
brought down the global financial system, we expect that
individuals with stronger self-enhancement and weaker
self-transcendence values will be more successful relative
to their industry peers when working in the finance industry
than when working in other industries.
Data for our empirical analysis come from the European
Social Survey or ESS (Jowell and Central Co-ordinating
Team 2007), which, depending on the exact sample that we
consider, covers up to 211,531 individuals. In different
waves, the ESS has collected information on the basic
values of respondents but also on their occupation, as well
as on other individual features, including the number of
subordinates that an individual has. We operationalize a
person’s career success as his/her position in the corporate
hierarchy measured by this latter variable and further use
the occupational data to distinguish between professionals
working in the finance industry (FIs) and people working in
other sectors, meaning every individual that is not working
as a professional in the finance industry (non-FIs).
Results do not reveal any cross-industry differences
consistent with the idea that the organizational culture in
the finance industry stands out from the organizational
culture in other industries in a way that implicates the
finance industry’s culture in the GFC. In fact, we find the
opposite, namely that, compared to other industries, in the
finance industry strong self-enhancement values and weak
self-transcendence values go together with less rather than
more career success relative to one’s peers working in the
same industry. Hence, if anything, the organizational cul-
ture in the finance industry does not seem to resonate well
with professionals that seek to pursue their own personal
gain at the expense of others. In terms of practical impli-
cations, we conclude that cultural change has only limited
potential to address the prevalence of malfeasance in the
finance industry. Instead, realistic and successful financial
reform asks for the redesigning of governance structures
and regulations as the factors with the most potential to
bring favorable change to the sector.
This paper makes two chief contributions. First, and
most obviously, the paper brings important insight on the
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much-debated issue of the cultural roots of the GFC and the
potential of cultural change to improve the financial sys-
tem. By presenting systematic evidence on the finance
industry’s organizational culture vis-a`-vis organizational
cultures in other industries, we help clarify the significance
of cultural change as part of reforms meant to improve the
current financial system. Second, we think that in devel-
oping our indirect method for assessing the culture in the
finance industry, we also make an important methodolog-
ical contribution. Although our approach is clearly not
without limitations, we find that the specific method that
we have developed for this paper is a promising addition to
the existing toolkit for studying organizational cultures. As
the approach is indirect, i.e., observing organizational
culture in the form of patterns of variation rather than
measuring it directly, the method would be particularly
useful whenever response biases are likely to invalidate
traditional approaches to culture assessment, for instance,
face-to-face interviews or employee surveys. Hence, we
call for more work to develop the method further, notably
by theorizing on the set of interrelationships between
employee traits and work outcomes, which needs to be
considered in order to provide a comprehensive charac-
terization of organizations’ culture that is comparable to
the established organizational culture frameworks.
Organizational Culture in the Finance Industry
Review of Prior Research
Although much debated, there have been few systematic
studies of the organizational culture in the finance industry.
Two studies stand out, although as we shall explain, it is
unclear what exactly these studies can tell us about the
finance industry’s culture.
First, Cohn et al. (2014) report on a laboratory experiment
involving bankers and nonbankers with material incentives
for dishonest behavior conducted in 2012. They find that, on
average, bankers are not statistically significantly more
prone to behaving dishonestly than people in other occupa-
tions are. However, adding a treatment by asking one group
of bankers to make explicit statements about their profes-
sional background did have a statistically significant effect.
Specifically, the group of bankers that was asked about their
professional background was found to be statistically sig-
nificantly more prone to dishonest behavior than the control
group of bankers that was not asked about their professional
backgroundwas. Cohn et al. (2014) attribute this effect to the
culture in the finance industry, concluding that this culture
makes employees behave more dishonestly.
Second, Van Hoorn (2015) considers the personal values
of professionals in the finance industry vis-a`-vis the
personal values of the general population. To prevent
biased responses, he uses survey data collected before the
start of the GFC in 2007. Results indicate that finance
professionals attach only trivially more value to power and
achievement (self-enhancement) and only trivially less
value to the welfare of others (self-transcendence) than the
general population does. Moreover, these differences dis-
appear completely or are overturned once standard indi-
vidual characteristics such as level of education are added
as control variables. Van Hoorn (2015) thus finds that
malfeasances in the finance industry and the GFC would
have occurred regardless of the specific individuals
employed in the industry.
Although interesting and important, our concern is that,
in the end, these two studies do not actually speak to the
culture in the finance industry. First, laboratory experi-
ments involving culture such as the study by Cohn et al.
(2014) are quasi-experimental in the sense that subjects are
not randomly assigned to different organizational cultures,
which would be required for a genuine experiment
(Shadish et al. 2002; Matsumoto and Van de Vijver 2011;
Van Hoorn 2012). Hence, it is not possible to ascertain
whether any treatment effect found is indeed causally due
to culture or due to some other factor or mechanism. Since
Cohn et al. (2014) conducted their study in 2012, a par-
ticular concern is the possibility that the collective repu-
tation of bankers, which has been severely tarnished in the
wake of the crisis (Roulet 2015), has interacted with the
authors’ treatment and ended up biasing the results. The
reason is that belonging to a group with a poor collective
reputation undermines the incentive for individual group
members to behave honestly (Tirole 1996). Hence, we
expect that asking people about their finance background
after the crisis increases dishonesty, but not because they
were reminded about the culture in the finance industry, but
because these bankers were less motivated to behave
honestly, once their banker identity was brought out in the
open. In fact, if collective reputation indeed accounts for
the effect found by Cohn et al. (2014), we expect that a
similar treatment effect occurs among any group of indi-
viduals that, like bankers, has a poor collective reputation
in the eyes of the public, once their group identity has been
brought out in the open. This, in turn, is confirmed by
another laboratory study of dishonesty but involving pris-
oners rather than bankers (Cohn et al. 2015).1
Second, it is similarly unclear how informative the
results by Van Hoorn (2015) are of the culture in the
finance industry (rather than of the individuals working in
this industry). The reason is that the culture of an
1 Specifically, this study reports that inmates whose prisoner identity
was made explicit behaved less honestly than the control group did,
but does not attribute this result to ‘‘prison culture.’’
Organizational Culture in the Financial Sector: Evidence from a Cross-Industry Analysis of…
123
organization comprises a whole lot more than the average
of the personal values of the individual employees that
work for the organization (Pettigrew 1979; Deal and
Kennedy 1982; Schein 1992). Hence, while Van Hoorn
(2015) effectively shows that the personal values of pro-
fessionals in the finance industry cannot be readily blamed
for the financial crisis (obvious individual wrongdoings
notwithstanding; e.g., Slater 2011), his results do not pro-
vide us with clear evidence on the significance of actual
organizational culture in the finance industry in relation to
this crisis.
The Finance Industry’s Culture in the Wake
of the Crisis
From the above review, we conclude that, as is, the liter-
ature lacks clear, systematic evidence on the culture in the
finance industry and, particularly, the significance of this
culture as a factor in the GFC. Nevertheless, because of all
the other, nonsystematic information that has become
available, we do have a clear idea of the specific features of
the finance industry’s culture that we need to study in order
to ascertain whether this culture may be blamed for the
GFC and assess the potential of cultural change to improve
the financial system. Specifically, (anecdotal) evidence on
the malfeasances that happened in the sector (e.g., Finan-
cial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011; Friedman 2011;
Santoro and Strauss 2012), raises suspicions as to whether
and to what extent the industry’s culture has been pro-
moting unethical behavior by individual employees. We
therefore think that systematic assessment of the finance
industry’s culture in relation to the GFC requires us to
gather evidence that speaks to the way in which the
industry has been uniquely conducive to individual
employees that put the maximization of their personal gain
above the best interests of the clients served by the
industry. This idea, in turn, leads us to posit the following
proposition as a way of summarizing the post-crisis criti-
cism of the organizational culture in the finance industry:
Proposition The culture in the finance industry has been
uniquely conducive to organizational members behaving
unethically, to the extent that this culture is partly to blame
for the global financial crisis.
The practical implication of this proposition is that
cultural change in the finance industry provides an
important route to improving the financial system,
decreasing the likelihood of future crises and optimizing
the intermediation between suppliers of credit and credit
seekers.
How exactly we bring the above proposition to data to
allow for a formal test requires some explication. Hence, in
the next section we first elaborate on the idea of
considering the relationship between employees’ personal
traits and their career success as a method for assessing
organizational culture before presenting our hypothesis.
Empirical Approach and Hypothesis
Organizational Culture, Employees’ Personal
Values, and Career Success
An Indirect Approach to Assessing Organizational Culture
The most common approach to measuring organizational
culture is through employee questionnaires where the
responses to different items are combined to construct
scores on a comprehensive set of dimensions (Ashkanasy
et al. 2000). In principle, we could use the same approach,
adding a cross-industry comparative perspective as a way
of assessing whether the culture in the finance industry is
indeed unique in a way that implicates this culture in the
GFC.2 However, we deviate from this established approach
for one simple reason, which is that we do not want to
assess the culture in the finance industry on the basis of
scores or measures obtained directly from the people
concerned. Given the fierce debate on the culture in the
finance industry that has followed the GFC (Roulet 2015),
we find that the risk of biased results is simply too great
when we allow post-crisis survey answers by finance pro-
fessionals (or laboratory behaviors for that matter) to have
direct bearing on our assessment (cf. Randall and Fernan-
des 1991; Crane 1999). Our indirect method of looking at
cross-industry differences in the relationship between per-
sonal traits and employee outcomes, in contrast, would still
rely on data collected from employees in the sector, but
none of these data would have direct bearing on our
assessment. Instead, the actual assessment of the culture in
the industry occurs completely outside the mind of the
people concerned, by researchers establishing relationships
between different variables. Ex-post combining of data on
employees’ personal traits with data on their work out-
comes enables us to estimate the relationship between these
two types of variables and use the pattern that emerges to
make unbiased inferences about the culture of the indus-
tries involved.
Obviously, the advantage of avoiding biased results
comes at the expense of using a novel method that has not
yet proven itself. However, we find that our method has a
strong theoretical basis as well as much intuitive appeal. To
2 The rationale for adding this cross-industry comparative perspec-
tive is, of course, that we can only blame the culture in the finance
industry for the GFC if this culture is, in fact, significantly different
from the culture in other industries.
A. van Hoorn
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start with the latter, imagine the following two organiza-
tions. In the first organization, it turns out that the most
egotistical employees are also the ones that have the most
successful careers within the organization. In the second
organization, however, the most egotistical employees are
the ones that have the least successful careers within the
organization. Now imagine what it must be like to be an
employee in one of these organizations and, especially,
what these employees would say about their respective
organizational environments. Clearly, we would expect
rather different answers, referring to rules, routines, pro-
cedures etc. deeply embedded in these organizations.
Accordingly, we think that it makes a lot of sense to assess
the culture of organizations on the basis of the relationship
between employees’ personal traits and the extent of their
career success relative to their peers.
Beyond this intuitive appeal, our approach has theoret-
ical roots in the literature on the effects of P–O on
employee outcomes (O’Reilly et al. 1991; Kristof 1996).
This literature provides ample evidence that the compati-
bility between employees’ traits, such as their personality
or values on the one hand, and organizational culture on the
other hand, is a powerful determinant of work outcomes
(Chapman et al. 2005; Kristof-Brown et al. 2005), includ-
ing employees’ workplace authority (Anderson et al. 2008).
Our approach to assessing the organizational culture in the
finance industry is rooted in this literature, specifically the
logic that certain personality or value traits are critical to
working successfully in some organizational cultures,
while these same traits hamper individuals’ ability to work
successfully in other organizational cultures. Taking the
influence of P–O fit on employee outcomes as a given, we
use inter-organizational or cross-industry differences in the
relationship between personal traits and work outcomes to
make inferences about the culture of the organizations or
industries involved.
An important open parameter in the design of a study
that assesses organizational culture indirectly by compar-
ing trait–outcome relationships is the specific traits and
employee outcomes that one considers. Following the
above example of two hypothetical organizations, we find
that one of the most suitable employee outcomes to look at
is career success relative to one’s peers working in the
same organization. For sure, there are many different
employee outcomes—as also considered by the literature
on P–O fit—that could be used. However, career success
seems a most relevant one, as career success provides a
strong motivation for employees to behave in a certain
way, including, potentially, misleading customers, delib-
erately withholding information from clients, and other
such unethical behaviors. Similarly, we find that traits that
speak to people’s motivations are most suitable for con-
sideration, as this type of traits seems more relevant in
relation to organizations’ culture than, for instance, expe-
rience or educational degree. Moreover, we think it more
appropriate to consider broad mental orientations rather
than narrow constructs that speak to only one specific
human disposition. Concretely, we thus deem it best to
consider employees’ personal values, which have the
attractive feature that they transcend specific actions or
situations (Schwartz 1992).
Meanwhile, values are rather complex constructs.
Hence, before turning to the formulation of our hypothesis,
we first discuss exactly which values we deem appropriate
for assessing organizational culture in general and for
assessing the culture in the finance industry in relation to
the GFC in particular.
Values
Values are concepts about desirable end states or behavior
that provide guidance to individuals in evaluating and
choosing between alternative courses of action across a
range of situations (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, p. 551).
Although a variety of approaches to conceptualizing values
exists, the literature has been converging on a standard
framework of universal values constructed with the aim of
capturing the complete spectrum of human motivations.
The development of this framework is mostly the work of
Shalom Schwartz (e.g., Schwartz and Bilsky 1987,
Schwartz 1992) and revolves around 10 basic values. The
description of these 10 basic values is as follows (taken
from Schwartz et al. 2001, p. 521): Power refers to social
status and prestige, control or dominance over people and
resources; Achievement refers to personal success through
demonstrating competence according to social standards;
Hedonism refers to pleasure and sensuous gratification for
oneself; Stimulation refers to excitement, novelty, and
challenge in life; Self-Direction refers to independent
thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring; Univer-
salism refers to understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and
protection for the welfare of all people and for nature;
Benevolence refers to preservation and enhancement of the
welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal
contact; Tradition refers to respect, commitment, and
acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture
or religion provide the self; Conformity refers to restraint of
actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm
others and violate social expectations or norms; and,
finally, Security refers to safety, harmony, and stability of
society, of relationships, and of self. The 10 basic values
combine to form four higher-order subdimensions, namely
self-enhancement (Power and Achievement), self-tran-
scendence (Benevolence and Universalism), openness-to-
change (Self-Direction, Stimulation, and Hedonism) and
conservation (Tradition, Conformity, and Security).
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Finally, the framework of universal human values com-
prises two overarching values dimensions, which combine
the opposing subdimensions: self-transcendence versus
self-enhancement and openness-to-change versus conser-
vation. The opposition of subdimensions reflects the
structure of human values, which is that values can be
mutually compatible or incompatible. Compatibility
thereby refers to the possibility of achieving certain values
simultaneously. Power and Achievement are compatible
with each other, for instance, but not with Universalism
and Benevolence (and vice versa).
Any of the basic values or values dimensions identified
in the framework of universal human values may predict a
person’s career success (cf. England and Lee 1974; Watson
and Williams 1977). However, for assessing the culture in
the finance industry in relation to the GFC, we are inter-
ested in a specific set of values, namely the basic values
that have most direct bearing on the malfeasances that have
been linked to the GFC (e.g., Stiglitz et al. 2010; Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). Following Van Hoorn
(2015), we find that there are four such values, namely
Power, Achievement, Benevolence, and Universalism.
Power and Achievement are thereby likely to capture
motivations that make individuals more prone to malfea-
sance, while Benevolence and Universalism are likely to
capture motivations that make individuals less prone to
malfeasance. However, as these four basic values combine
into the subdimensions of self-enhancement (SE) and self-
transcendence (ST) as well as the overarching self-tran-
scendence versus self-enhancement (ST/SE) dimension, in
our empirical analysis we focus on these latter three value
constructs.
Hypothesis
Our hypothesis derives directly from the proposition that
the culture in the finance industry stands out from the
culture in other industries in a way that implicates this
culture in the GFC. Comparing the values–success rela-
tionship in the finance industry with the values–success
relationship in other industries allows us to check whether
these two relationships differ in a way that is consistent
with the idea that the finance industry’s culture promotes
unethical behavior more than organizational cultures else-
where do. Following our proposition on the culture in the
finance industry, specifically this culture’s effect on
malfeasance and employees putting the maximization of
own personal gain above the interests of the clients that
they serve, we expect that individuals with strong ST
values/weak SE values will have a hard time working in
this industry. Individuals with strong SE values/weak ST
values, on the other hand, will thrive in the finance
industry. More concretely, and taking in the literature that
relates P–O fit to employee outcomes, we posit that indi-
viduals with strong SE values have a better fit with the
finance industry and therefore enjoy more career success in
this industry than individuals with weak SE values do.
And, similarly, we expect that individuals with strong ST
values have a poorer fit with the finance industry and
therefore enjoy less career success in this industry than
individuals with weak ST values do. Moreover, we posit
that the finance industry is, overall, much more apprecia-
tive of strong SE values and much more dismissive of
strong ST values than other industries are. Hence, we
translate the proposition presented in the previous section
into the following hypothesis (H1):
Hypothesis 1 Career success in the finance industry
correlates more positively with the strength of individuals’
self-enhancement values and more negatively with the
strength of individuals’ self-transcendence values than
career success in other industries does.
We test this hypothesis below. First, however, we dis-
cuss our sample and measures and details of our statistical
method, specifically the empirical model that we estimate
to test this hypothesis.
Sample, Measures, and Statistical Method
Sample
Our data come from the first six waves of the European
Social Survey or ESS (Jowell and Central Co-ordinating
Team 2007). The ESS is a bi-annual survey of nationally
representative samples of mostly European countries. The
survey started in 2002 so that we have data collected in
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012. For our baseline
analysis, we use data collected in all these years. However,
as a robustness check, we also consider data collected
before the start of the GFC only, meaning data collected
between 2002 and 2006. The countries in our main sample
are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Fin-
land, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary,
Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine (32 in total).
The data collected by the ESS varies from measures of
respondents’ basic values to a variety of demographic
variables and other background characteristics, including
respondents’ occupation and the number of subordinates
that they have. Our sample comprises all individuals with
nonmissing data on the relevant variables. Depending on
choices regarding the time of data collection (see above)
and the variables considered, the sample for the empirical
A. van Hoorn
123
analysis can cover up to 211,531 individuals (our main
sample). The ESS is the source for all our data, both the
dependent and the independent variables in our estimating
equation. Note, however, that common method bias is not a
problem, as our interest is not so much in explaining dif-
ferences in absolute levels of a variable, but in comparing
relationships between variables across different groups,
specifically professionals working in finance (FIs) vis-a`-vis
people working in other industries (non-FIs). Additionally,
common method bias would be most problematic when
both the dependent and independent variables in the anal-
ysis concern subjective assessments, which is typically not
the case in our analysis. More information on the ESS and
the variables included in this survey is available from the
ESS website, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
Measures
Classification of Professionals Working in the Finance
Industry
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis concerns
individuals’ career success. Similarly, the main indepen-
dent variable in our analysis concerns individuals’ personal
values. Nevertheless, the key variable in our analysis is the
measure that we use to identify respondents as working in
the finance industry (FI) or not (non-FI). We follow Van
Hoorn (2015) and create a dummy variable to classify
individuals as FI (score of 1) or not (score of 0) on the basis
of four-digit occupational codes from the International
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The first
five waves of the ESS (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010)
classify people’s occupation on the basis of the 1988 ISCO
classification (ISCO88), which is also used by Van Hoorn
(2015). In the 1988 classification, the occupational cate-
gories that we classify as FIs are: Finance and sales
associate professionals (ISCO88 3410); Securities and
finance dealers and brokers (ISCO88 3411); Business
services agents and trade brokers (ISCO88 3420); and
Trade brokers (ISCO88 3421) (see Van Hoorn 2015). For
Wave 6, the ESS switched to the 2008 ISCO classification
(ISCO08). In this classification, the occupational categories
that we classify as FIs are: Financial and investment
advisers (ISCO08 2412) and Securities and finance dealers
and brokers (ISCO08 3311). Throughout, our identification
criterion is strict in the sense of only considering profes-
sionals in the finance industry and not support staff or other
types of employees, as these are not the kind of employees
whose behavior has been blamed for the GFC.
Overall, we have almost 800 individuals classified as FI
in our analysis, where the exact number depends on the
sample chosen and the other variables (e.g., control vari-
ables) included in the analysis. However, for one of our
robustness checks, we also consider a still narrower clas-
sification of FIs, for which we re-classify Finance and sales
associate professionals (ISCO88 3410) and Business ser-
vices agents and trade brokers (ISCO88 3420) as non-FIs.
In this case, we have almost 450 individuals classified as
FIs in our analysis. More information on the ISCO88 and
ISCO08 classification can be found on the website of the
ESS that we mentioned earlier and, particularly, the web-
site of the International Labour Organisation, http://www.
ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco.
Dependent Variable: Employee Career Success
The dependent variable in our empirical analysis is the
success that an individual is able to achieve in his/her
professional career. Of course, career success can be
defined and operationalized in a variety of ways and, at any
rate, is a highly subjective concept. We measure an indi-
vidual’s career success by the number of subordinates that
he or she has, if any. This measure derives from the item
included in the ESS that asks respondents how many
people they are/were responsible for in their job. In case
the respondent is not responsible for supervising the work
of other employees, the number of subordinates equals 0.
Because this specific measure is left-censored, we apply a
simple logarithmic transformation. However, because we
cannot take the logarithm of 0, we first add 1 to the number
of subordinates that the respondent has and then take the
natural logarithm of the resulting sum.
To assess the robustness of our results we also consider
two alternative indicators of an individual’s career success.
The first of these concerns the amount of authority that the
respondent has at his/her place of work. We construct this
measure as the principal component of two items in the
ESS asking respondents about the autonomy and the
influence that they have at their job. The first item reads as
follows: ‘‘please say how much the management at your
work allows/allowed you to decide how your own daily
work is/was organised?’’ where answers can range from 0,
I have/had no influence to 10, I have/had complete control.
The second item similarly reads: ‘‘please say how much the
management at your work allows/allowed you to influence
policy decisions about the activities of the organisation?’’
where answers can also range from 0, I have/had no
influence to 10, I have/had complete control. Both these
items have been used in studies of the quality of jobs and
workplace practices (e.g., Esser & Olsen, 2012). More
generally, these items tap into the core features of a job as
identified in the literature on job design and job charac-
teristics (Hackman and Oldham 1975). Cronbach’s alpha
for the combination of these two measures equals 0.783,
which signals more than adequate internal consistency
(George and Mallery 2003).
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For our second alternative measure of career success, we
seek to take into account that one’s position in the corpo-
rate hierarchy is not only a function of the absolute number
of subordinates that one has but also the number of sub-
ordinates relative to the total size of the organization for
which one works. The ESS asks respondents about the size
of the organization that they work for using the following
item: ‘‘Including yourself, about how many people are/
were employed at the place where you usually work/-
worked.’’ There are five possible answer categories:
(i) Under 10; (ii) 10–24; (iii) 25–99; (iv) 100–499; and
(v) 500 or more. Since organization size is measured on a
cardinal scale, we deem it unwise to simply divide the
number of subordinates by the size of the organization to
construct our second alternative measure of professional
career success. Instead, we first convert both the number of
subordinates measure and the organization size measure
into percentile scores, before taking their division. Table 1
presents descriptive statistics for all three measures of
employee career success that we consider, both for the
sample as a whole and for the subsamples of FIs only.
Main Independent Variables: Self-Enhancement and Self-
Transcendence Values
As indicated, the personal values that we consider derive
from the standard framework of universal human values.
We operationalize the basic values and higher-order
dimensions in this framework using the 21-item Portrait
Values Questionnaire or PVQ (Schwartz et al. 2001). The
term ‘‘portrait’’ thereby refers to the specific way in which
the PVQ elicits values from respondents, namely by asking
respondents to describe themselves in comparison to a
portrait presented to them by the interviewer. Answers are
given on a Likert-type scale, allowing respondents to
indicate how much the described person is like them (1,
Very much like me—6, Not like me at all). Follow the
standard recoding protocol for the PVQ, we ipsatize ratings
on the separate items of the PVQ by subtracting the aver-
age score of the respondent on all the items included in the
PVQ. The reason is that the framework of universal human
values finds that values have a relative priority, meaning
that values are only important or unimportant relative to
other values. Hence, an individual may indicate that he/she
finds money and material possessions unimportant but may
attach even less importance to the well-being of friends. To
calculate SE and ST values, we subsequently first calculate
the underlying basic values: Power and Achievement (SE
values); and Benevolence and Universalism (ST values).3
Finally, we calculate ST/SE scores by subtracting an
individual’s SE score from his/her ST score. Table 1 pre-
sents descriptive statistics on the resulting measures.
As stated, the reason for considering the SE and ST
values from the framework of universal human values (and
not other basic values) is that these specific values have a
clear conceptual match with the kind of malfeasances that
have come to be associated with the GFC (cf. Van Hoorn
2015). This conceptual match has an empirical counterpart,
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Whole sample Finance industry
professionals
Finance industry
professionals, narrow
classification
Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD
Finance industry professional (0/1) .38 % 213,283 6.14 %
Finance industry professional, narrow classification (0/1) .21 % 213,283 4.59 %
Number of subordinates 6.57 211,531 99.6 3.93 797 14.5 3.38 446 13.8
Workplace authority (principal component) 0 182,553 1 .38 674 .85 .38 376 .87
Position in corporate hierarchy 1.53 206,174 1.35 1.64 783 1.38 1.62 435 1.33
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement (ST/SE) values 1.27 213,283 1.11 1.08 806 1.10 1.01 450 1.15
Self-transcendence (ST) values .63 213,283 .52 .58 806 .50 .53 450 .52
Self-enhancement (SE) values -.64 213,283 .73 -.50 806 .73 -.47 450 .76
Years of education 12.5 213,283 3.97 14.1 806 3.48 14.4 450 3.34
Total hours normally worked per week 40.4 213,283 13.9 40.8 806 12.4 40.5 450 12.2
Data collected before start of crisis (0/1) 43.7 % 213,283 49.6 % 47.8 % 806 50.0 % 38.4 % 450 48.7 %
Paid cash with no receipt to avoid tax (1, never—5, five or
more times)
1.86 33,170 1.51 1.83 146 1.40 1.81 63 1.27
Made exaggerated or false insurance claim (1, never—5, five
or more times)
1.33 33,712 1.19 1.34 146 1.16 1.14 63 .67
3 The exact wording of the nine portraits used to measure these
values is available on request.
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however, as there is ample evidence demonstrating a link
between individuals’ SE and ST values and such concrete
behaviors as sharing and helping as well as delinquency
and shoplifting (see Schwartz 2009 for a survey). However,
a possible critique of the personal values that we consider
is that such broad dispositional measures are, in fact, rather
far removed from the concrete malfeasances that have
come to be associated with the finance industry in general
and the GFC in particular. Hence, as a robustness check,
we also conduct our main empirical analysis replacing our
values measures with two behavioral measures. These two
alternative measures derive from items included in the
2004 wave of the ESS that ask individuals how often they
have engaged in a particular type of dishonest behavior
during the last 5 years, namely (i) made an exaggerated or
false insurance claim or (ii) paid cash without a receipt to
avoid some tax. Answers can range from 1, Never to 5,
Five or more times so that a higher score indicates more
dishonesty.4 Table 1 again presents descriptive statistics.
As the data on insurance fraud and tax fraud have only
been collected in 2004, our sample is much smaller when
considering these measures than when considering indi-
viduals’ basic values.
Control Variables
To check the robustness of some of our results and to extend
our main analysis, we typically control for various traits of
individuals other than their values. These variables concern
some standard demographics as well as other personal traits
that may play a role in the workplace. To start with the
former, we consider both individuals’ sex (1 = male) and
age. We calculate age by combining the year of data col-
lection with the answer on the ESS questionnaire item
asking respondents about their year of birth. When adding
control variables we include a linear and a quadratic age
term. Education is a first of the other personal traits that we
consider. When adding educational controls we add both a
set of dummy variables to indicate level of education
(completed elementary education, incomplete secondary
education, etc.; eight categories in total) and a continuous
measure of the years of education that the individual has.
We further take into account differences in working hours,
finding that the amount of time that someone invests in his/
her job likely correlates with both career success and
personal values. Finally, we control for the nature of the
individual’s employment relation, notably whether some-
one is self-employed or not, and country fixed effects. For
both these factors, we construct a set of dummy variables,
selecting one category as the reference category.
To save space, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for a
selected set of control variables only. Descriptive statistics for
the nonreported control variables are available on request.
Statistical Method
To test our hypothesis, we use regression analysis. The
dependent variable is the career success of individual i,
which we denote by Si. Similarly, the main independent
variable in our analysis concerns the personal values of the
individual, which we denote by Vi. Chief feature of H1 is
that it involves a comparison between career success in the
finance industry and career success in other industries. We
incorporate this feature in our empirical model through an
interaction term that allows the relationship between peo-
ple’s values and career success to vary across industries,
specifically the finance industry vis-a`-vis all other indus-
tries. Using FIi to refer to the dummy variable indicating
whether the individual is a professional working in the
finance industry or not, the resulting model is given by
Si ¼ b0 þ b1Vi þ b2ðVi  FIiÞ þ b3FIi þ b4Xi þ ei; ð1Þ
Although this empirical model incorporates a direct
effect of people’s values on career success, the most
important term is the interaction term involving individuals’
industry of employment and their personal values (Vi 9 Fi).
Obviously, the model also controls for the direct effect of
being employed in the finance industry. Practically, Eq. 1
thus provides a model for predicting individuals’ career
success relative to peers active in the same industry. H1 is
confirmed when b2 is statistically significantly negative for
ST and ST/SE values and statistically significantly positive
for SE values. In that case, the finance industry appears more
appreciative of values directed toward personal gain (self-
enhancement) and less appreciative of values directed
toward the well-being of others (self-transcendence) than
other industries are (and vice versa in case b2 is statistically
significantly positive for ST and ST/SE values and statisti-
cally significantly negative for SE values). Similarly, when
using our two alternatives to personal values, the measures
of insurance fraud and of tax fraud, respectively, H1 is
confirmed when b2 is statistically significantly positive.
To be sure, our statistical method, as well as the fact that
we consider individuals’ career success as the dependent
variable, appears sensitive to selection issues. Because of
classic attraction, selection, and attrition effects (e.g.,
Schneider 1987), at any point in time, the group of people
(not) working in the finance industry is not a random
4 We have also calculated the correlations between the measures of
insurance fraud and tax fraud and the basic values from the
framework of universal human values. These correlations equal
-0.03 and -0.05 for ST values, 0.05 and 0.08 for SE values, and
-0.05 and -0.08 for ST/SE values (p values equal 0.00 in all cases;
n = 42,437 for insurance fraud, and n = 41,691 for tax fraud),
providing further support for considering these specific values in our
analysis.
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sample but comprises people that are, to a certain extent,
selected into this industry (or the other industries) on
purpose. In fact, following the importance of P–O fit for
employee outcomes, people are partly attracted to a par-
ticular industry because their personal value traits have a
good match with the organizational culture in this industry.
As a consequence, a bias would occur if we were to
compare the career success of FIs with a certain set of
values with the career success of non-FIs with the same set
of values. However, this is not what we actually do in our
analysis, as the comparison that we draw is between the
career successes of individuals with different sets of values
that are all working in the same industry. And because the
comparison that we make is between individuals that have
all underwent the same process of attraction, selection, and
attrition, our analysis is not biased on the count of some
sort of selection problem. Meanwhile, we have also for-
mally tested whether the model that determines whether
someone is an FI or not is independent of the model that
determines someone’s career success (Heckman 1979),
finding that we could not reject the null hypothesis of
independence at usual levels of statistical significance.
Empirical Results
Baseline Results
To start, we first estimate the simple relationship between
individuals’ personal values and the number of subordi-
nates that they have, also adding an interaction term
involving the industry in which the individual is employed
(FI versus non-FI) (Models 1–3 in Table 2). Results show
that scoring higher on self-transcendence (ST) and self-
transcendence versus self-enhancement (ST/SE) values is
associated with having fewer subordinates, on average,
while this association is positive for self-enhancement (SE)
values. As we would expect, these correlations remain
when adding the interaction terms that allow the size and
the sign of these correlations to differ between the finance
industry and other industries (Models 4–6 in Table 2).
More importantly, the estimated coefficients for the
interaction terms (Models 4–6) consistently indicate that
people with stronger SE values and weaker ST values do
not enjoy more career success relative to their industry
peers when they are working in the finance industry than
when they are working in other industries. Hence, the
results do not support H1 and, in fact, almost the opposite
pattern than the pattern predicted by H1 holds. Scoring
higher on ST or ST/SE values has a statistically signifi-
cantly (p\ 0.1) less negative effect on the number of
subordinates that someone has when working in the finance
industry than when working in other industries (Models 4
and 5). Similarly, having stronger SE values has a less
positive effect on career success in the finance industry
than in other industries, although in this case the difference,
as measured by the coefficient for the interaction term, is
not statistically significant at usual levels (p = 0.15)
(Model 6). In terms of effect size, the coefficients for the
interaction terms are typically strong enough to overturn a
positive or negative direct effect of a set of personal values
on individuals’ career success. As an example, while ST/
Table 2 Which industry’s culture fits better with strong self-enhancement and weak self-transcendence values?
Dependent variable = number of subordinates that
respondent has
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values (ST/SE) -.02***
(.00)
– – -.02***
(.00)
– –
Self-transcendence values (ST) – .00 (.00) – – .003
(.002)
–
Self-enhancement values (SE) – – .03***
(.00)
– – .03***
(.00)
ST/SE values 9 finance industry (0/1) – – – .06* (.04) – –
ST values 9 finance industry (0/1) – – – – .07* (.04) –
SE values 9 finance industry (0/1) – – – – – -.05 (.04)
Finance industry (0/1) .07* (.04) .07**
(.04)
.07* (.04) .08** (.04) .08**
(.04)
.08** (.04)
No. of finance industry professionals in sample 797 797 797 797 797 797
Total sample size 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531
R2 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
As described in the main text, the dependent variable is log-transformed by adding 1 to the number of subordinates and taking the natural
logarithm of the resulting sum. A minus sign for the coefficient implies that the respondent has fewer subordinates. Continuous (non-dummy)
variables (both dependent and independent) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard errors in parentheses
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level
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SE values have a negative effect on career success relative
to one’s industry peers, the net effect in the finance
industry is positive (-0.02 ? 0.06 & 0.04) (Model 4).
More generally, effect sizes tend to be small, as expressed
in small standardized coefficients and low variance
explained.
Robustness Checks
As indicated in the previous section, we apply different
tests to assess the robust of our baseline findings (Tables 3,
4, 5).
Controlling for Possible Confounders
A most prominent challenge to the analyses presented in
Table 2 is the possibility of an omitted variable bias.
Specifically, a third variable may be associated both with
individuals’ values and with the likelihood that an indi-
vidual works in the finance industry, for instance his/her
level of education. If this is the case, there will be a bias in
the coefficient for the interaction term that allows us to
assess the culture in the finance industry vis-a`-vis the
culture in other industries. To deal with this issue, we
estimate our main empirical models (Models 4–6), adding a
variety of control variables, including, not least, years of
education and total hours worked. Table 3 presents the
results, where we again estimate separate models for ST/
SE, ST and SE values (Models 7-9).
Most relevant finding is that results again do not support
H1. In fact, in all three cases, the sign of the coefficient for
the interaction term is counter to H1. Moreover, in two out
of three cases (Models 7 and 9) this coefficient not only has
the wrong sign but is statistically significant at usual levels
as well (p\ 0.1). Meanwhile, we prefer the empirical
model specification that includes control variables (Models
7–9) over the model specification that does not include
control variables (Models 4–6), as the former specification
allows for an analysis of the relationship between people’s
personal values and their career success that is unbiased by
confounders. For the remainder of our analyses, we
therefore always include control variables.
Behavioral Measures Instead of Values
A second challenge to our baseline analysis is that the SE
and ST values that we consider really do not match the kind
of malfeasances associated with the finance industry in
Table 3 Robustness check: control variables added and replacing dispositional measures of employee traits with behavioral measures
Dependent variable = number of subordinates that respondent has Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Behavioral measures
Model 10 Model 11
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values (ST/SE) -.04*** (.00) – – – –
Self-transcendence values (ST) – -.02*** (.00) – – –
Self-enhancement values (SE) – – .04*** (.00) – –
ST/SE values 9 finance industry (0/1) .06* (.03) – – – –
ST values 9 finance industry (0/1) – .05 (.03) – – –
SE values 9 finance industry (0/1) – – -.05* (.03) – –
Insurance fraud – – – .01* (.01) –
Insurance fraud 9 finance industry (0/1) – – – -.01 (.06) –
Tax fraud – – – – .03*** (.01)
Tax fraud 9 finance industry (0/1) – – – – -.07 (.08)
Finance industry (0/1) -.05 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.05 (.03) .15* (.08) .14* (.08)
Years of education .15*** (.00) .15*** (.00) .15*** (.00) .19*** (.01) .19*** (.01)
Total hours worked per week .17*** (.00) .17*** (.00) .17*** (.00) .16*** (.01) .16*** (.01)
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of finance industry professionals in sample 797 797 797 137 140
Total sample size 211,531 211,531 211,531 31,427 30,994
R2 .14 .14 .14 .14 .14
As described in the main text, the dependent variable is log-transformed by adding 1 to the number of subordinates and taking the natural
logarithm of the resulting sum. A minus sign for the coefficient implies that the respondent has fewer subordinates. Continuous (non-dummy)
variables (both dependent and independent) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The complete set of control
variables is age, age squared, sex (dummy variable), educational degree (dummy variables), years of education (see table), total hours worked per
week (see table), type of employment relation (dummy variables), and a complete set of country dummies. Standard errors in parentheses
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level
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general and the GFC in particular. However, replacing our
values measures with behavioral measures concerning
dishonest behavior, specifically insurance fraud or tax
fraud, does not change the results (Models 10–11 in
Table 3). Individuals that have committed insurance or tax
fraud more often during the past 5 years enjoy less rather
than more relative career success in the finance industry
compared to other industries, although the difference is not
statistically significant at usual levels.
Alternative Measures of Individuals’ Career Success
While the number of subordinates that a person has is the
main dependent variable in our analysis, we also want to
make sure that this specific operationalization of individ-
uals’ career success is not somehow affecting our results.
To assess the robustness of our baseline results for the
specific operationalization chosen, we repeat our estima-
tion of our preferred empirical models, meaning the
empirical models that include control variables (Models
7–9 in Table 3).
Results are again robust (Table 4). Specifically, coeffi-
cients for the interaction terms are never both statistically
significant and of the sign predicted by H1. In fact, there
are only two cases out of six (Models 15 and 16) in which
there is a statistically significant difference between the
finance industry and other industries in the relationship
between personal values and career success (p\ 0.1).
However, in both these cases, the sign is in the direction
opposite to the direction predicted by H1, thus providing
statistically significant evidence counter to this hypothesis.
Potential Biases Resulting from Including Post-Crisis Data
Since some of the data that we use have been collected
after the start of the GFC in 2007, there is the potential that
responses are biased by the intense, post-crisis debate on
the finance industry’s culture. We do not immediately see
how this would cause a problem for the present analysis,
given the indirect approach to assessing organizational
culture that we employ. However, as indicated, we also
check the robustness of our findings using a sample com-
prising only data collected before the start of the crisis.
As expected, results are largely the same as before
(Models 18–20 in Table 5). The main difference is that we
do not find statistically significant evidence counter to H1
as we did before, which is likely the result of having fewer
FIs in the sample than before (380 vs. 797 for Models 7–9).
Still, though, we do not find any evidence whatsoever
supporting H1 either.
Table 4 Results for two alternative measures of individuals’ career success
Dependent variable = level of authority
that respondent has
Dependent variable = position in the
corporate hierarchy
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values
(ST/SE)
-.02***
(.00)
– – -.02***
(.00)
– –
Self-transcendence values (ST) – -.02***
(.00)
– – -.02***
(.00)
–
Self-enhancement values (SE) – – .02***
(.00)
– – .01***
(.00)
ST/SE values 9 finance industry (0/1) .00 (.03) – – .071** (.03) – –
ST values 9 finance industry (0/1) – -.01 (.03) – – .05 (.03) –
SE values 9 finance industry (0/1) – – -.01 (.03) – – -.07**
(.03)
Finance industry (0/1) .15*** (.03) .15*** (.03) .15***
(.03)
.01 (.03) .00 (.03) .01 (.03)
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of finance industry professionals in sample 674 674 674 783 783 783
Total sample size 182,553 182,553 182,553 206,174 206,174 206,174
R2 .34 .34 .34 .17 .17 .17
Continuous (non-dummy) variables (both dependent and independent) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The
complete set of control variables is age, age squared, sex (dummy variable), educational degree (dummy variables), years of education (see
table), total hours worked per week (see table), type of employment relation (dummy variables), and a complete set of country dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level
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A Different Classification of Professionals in the Finance
Industry
As a last robustness check, we apply a stricter criterion for
classifying individuals as professionals working in the
finance industry. Applying this stricter criterion reduces the
total number of FIs in our sample from 797 (Tables 2, 3) to
446. Also in this case, however, results are largely unaf-
fected (Models 21–23 in Table 5). Notably, the estimated
coefficients for the interaction terms still go against H1,
though they lack statistical significance at usual levels.
Extension: Comparative Results for Selected Other
Industries
So far, our analysis has considered the finance industry vis-
a`-vis all other industries. However, to get a better sense of
how exactly industries may differ in terms of the observed
relationship between people’s personal values and their
career success, it is helpful to consider some other indus-
tries in detail as well. We have selected two such industries
that fit with prior stereotypes as to the kind of organiza-
tional culture that they might have, highly appreciative of
ST values and highly dismissive of SE values, and the other
way around. The first industry concerns nursing and mid-
wifery, which we expect to have an organizational culture
that resonates better with individuals with strong ST values
and weak SE values. Similarly, the second industry
involves professionals working as retail or wholesale trade
managers, which we expect to have an organizational
culture that resonates better with individuals with strong
SE values and weak ST values.5
Consistent with our stereotypical characterization of the
two industries, results (Table 6) indicate that individuals
with strong ST values/weak SE values enjoy statistically
significant more career success relative to their peers in the
nursing/midwifery industry vis-a`-vis other industries, while
individuals with strong SE values/weak ST values enjoy
more career success relative to their peers working in retail
or wholesale trade than when working in other industries.
A most interesting finding is that, overall, inter-industry
differences found are much more pronounced than the
inter-industry differences found when comparing the
finance industry with other industries. For nursing and
Table 5 Robustness checks using pre-crisis data and a more narrow classification of finance professionals
Dependent variable = number of subordinates that
respondent has
Pre-crisis data More narrow classification of finance
industry professionals
Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values (ST/
SE)
-.05***
(.003)
– – -.04***
(.00)
– –
Self-transcendence values (ST) – -.03***
(.00)
– – -.02***
(.00)
–
Self-enhancement values (SE) – – .05***
(.00)
– – .04***
(.00)
ST/SE values 9 finance industry (0/1) .02 (.050) – – .05 (.04) – –
ST values 9 finance industry (0/1) – .06 (.05) – – .03 (.05) –
SE values 9 finance industry (0/1) – – .01 (.05) – – -.05 (.04)
Finance industry (0/1) .02 (.05) .02 (.05) .01 (.05) -.13***
(.05)
-.13***
(.04)
-.13***
(.04)
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of finance industry professionals in sample 380 380 380 446 446 446
Total sample size 92,249 92,249 92,249 211,531 211,531 211,531
R2 .15 .15 .15 .14 .14 .14
As described in the main text, the dependent variable is log-transformed by adding 1 to the number of subordinates and taking the natural
logarithm of the resulting sum. A minus sign for the coefficient implies that the respondent has fewer subordinates. Continuous (non-dummy)
variables (both dependent and independent) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The complete set of control
variables is age, age squared, sex (dummy variable), educational degree (dummy variables), years of education (see table), total hours worked per
week (see table), type of employment relation (dummy variables), and a complete set of country dummies. Standard errors in parentheses
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level
5 The group of Nursing or midwifery professionals comprises four
ISCO categories: Nursing and midwifery professionals (ISCO88
2230); Nursing and midwifery professionals (ISCO08 2220); Nursing
professionals (ISCO08 2221); and Midwifery professionals (ISCO08
2222). The group of Retail or wholesale trade managers comprises
two ISCO categories: Managers in wholesale and retail trade
(ISCO88 1224); and Retail and wholesale trade managers (ISCO08
1420).
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midwifery professionals, for instance, we find a coefficient
for the interaction term involving ST values of 0.08 (Model
25 in Table 6), which is more than 50 % larger than the
coefficient of 0.05 that we found for professionals in the
finance industry (Model 8 in Table 3). Moreover, whereas
SE values had a more negative effect on career success in
the finance industry than in other industries (Model 9 in
Table 3), SE values have a more positive effect on career
success in retail or wholesale trade than in other industries
(Model 29 in Table 6).6 Most important finding of the
above exercise, however, is that our indirect method for
assessing organizational culture appears quite capable of
picking up important differences in the organizational
culture in different industries.
Discussion
Overall, our results do not reveal any evidence that sup-
ports the proposition that the culture in the finance industry
is unique in a way that implicates this culture in the GFC.
While the idea that the culture in the finance industry is
partly to blame for the GFC has been hugely popular and
larded with anecdotes (e.g., Fox 2010; Friedman 2011), our
results present no indication whatsoever that the finance
industry’s culture indeed stands out from the culture in
other industries in terms of fostering malfeasance. We have
empirically assessed whether the culture in the finance
industry deviates significantly from other industries in the
sense that employees need to have strong self-enhancement
values and weak self-transcendence values in order to be
successful in this industry. Results, however, unambigu-
ously indicate that this is not the case. Instead, the opposite
appears to hold, which is that strong self-enhancement
(Power and Achievement) values and weak self-transcen-
dence (Benevolence and Universalism) values go together
with less relative career success in the finance industry
compared to other industries.
Table 6 A comparative perspective: results for two other industries
Dependent variable = number of subordinates that
respondent has
Nursing or midwifery professionals Retail or wholesale trade managers
Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29
Self-transcendence versus self-enhancement values (ST/
SE)
-.04***
(.00)
– – -.04***
(.00)
– –
Self-transcendence values (ST) – -.02***
(.00)
– – -.02***
(.00)
–
Self-enhancement values (SE) – – .04***
(.00)
– – .04***
(.00)
ST/SE values 9 nursing or midwifery professional (0/1) .08*** (.02) – – – – –
ST values 9 nursing or midwifery professional (0/1) – .08*** (.02) – – – –
SE values 9 nursing or midwifery professional (0/1) – – -.06**
(.02)
– – –
ST/SE values 9 retail or wholesale trade (0/1) – – – -.06 (.04) – –
ST values 9 retail or wholesale trade (0/1) – – – – -.04 (.04) –
SE values 9 retail or wholesale trade (0/1) – – – – – .06 (.04)
Nursing or midwifery professional (0/1) .30*** (.02) .29*** (.02) .31 (.02) – – –
Retail or wholesale trade (0/1) – – – 1.18***
(.04)
1.19***
(.04)
1.19***
(.04)
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of professionals in sample 1523 1523 1523 636 636 636
Total sample size 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531 211,531
R2 .14 .14 .14 .15 .15 .15
As described in the main text, the dependent variable is log-transformed by adding 1 to the number of subordinates and taking the natural
logarithm of the resulting sum. A minus sign for the coefficient implies that the respondent has fewer subordinates. Continuous (non-dummy)
variables (both dependent and independent) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The complete set of control
variables is age, age squared, sex (dummy variable), educational degree (dummy variables), years of education (see table), total hours worked per
week (see table), type of employment relation (dummy variables), and a complete set of country dummies. Standard errors in parentheses
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % level
6 To be complete, the coefficient for this last effect lacks statistical
significance at usual levels (p = 0.11), even though the absolute size
of the coefficient in Model 29 (0.06) is larger than the absolute size of
the coefficient in Model 9 (0.05). Explanation for the lower statistical
significance despite a larger effect size is that the number of retail or
wholesale trade managers is lower than the number of professionals
working in the finance industry, 636 versus 797.
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Clearly, the indirect method for assessing organizational
culture that we have used, comparing the values–success
relationship found for the finance industry with the values–
success relationship found for other industries, can be a
limiting factor. Notably, results might depend on the par-
ticular relationships and measures that we have considered
in the empirical analysis. However, extensive checks
indicate that our results are robust to using a range of
alternative operationalizations and measures of our key
dependent and independent variables, not least various
alternatives by which to measure individuals’ career suc-
cess. Hence, the conclusion following our empirical anal-
ysis is simply that, since the culture in the finance industry
does not resonate well with professionals that seek to
pursue their own personal gain at the expense of others, the
finance industry’s culture cannot be blamed for the GFC.
Conclusion
Given that finance plays a central role in the daily lives of
individuals and organizations alike, a fundamental question
following the global financial crisis (GFC) is how the
financial system can be improved to decrease the likelihood
of future crises and optimize the intermediation between
suppliers of credit and credit seekers. A factor often
highlighted as one of the chief culprits in the GFC is the
culture in the finance industry, which is said to have fos-
tered the widespread malfeasances that brought down the
financial system. This paper has provided a systematic
assessment of the finance industry’s culture in relation to
the GFC.
In the wake of the GFC, the culture in the finance
industry has been fiercely debated. A main challenge for
our study has therefore been that quasi-experiments or
survey measures cannot be readily used, as being subject of
intense criticism is likely to bias people’s behavior in such
experiments or their answers to culture-related survey
questions. We have sought to overcome this challenge by
developing a novel method for assessing the culture of an
organization (or in an industry) that does not consider
culture directly but focuses on the relationship between
employees’ personal traits and their career success in the
organization (or industry) under study. With strong theo-
retical roots in the large literature on the effects of P–O fit
on employee outcomes, the idea behind this ex-post
method is that we can infer a great deal about the culture of
an organization by simply observing which personal traits
help or hamper individual employees to be successful in
this organization. The actual assessment of organizational
culture subsequently does not revolve around measures or
scores collected directly from the people concerned, as is
typical in the literature (e.g., through employee surveys),
but around inter-organizational (or cross-industry) varia-
tion in the relationship between personal traits and
employee outcomes.
We have applied this method to assess the proposition
that the culture in the finance industry is partly to blame for
the GFC because it has been uniquely conducive to orga-
nizational members behaving unethically. Empirical results
subsequently indicated systematic differences between the
finance industry and other industries in terms of the extent
to which employees’ so-called self-enhancement values
(i.e., values emphasizing the pursuit of private gain) and
so-called self-transcendence values (i.e., values emphasiz-
ing caring for others) are associated with career success
relative to one’s industry peers. However, in all cases, the
finance industry appeared less appreciative of self-en-
hancement and more appreciative of self-transcendence
than other industries are. Hence, we did not find any sort of
cross-industry differences that would implicate the finance
industry’s culture in the GFC.
Based on these findings, we conclude that the organi-
zational culture in the finance industry has not been a
significant factor in the GFC. This conclusion, in turn, has
important implications for reforms meant to improve the
current financial system. The GFC has helped uncover
important weaknesses of the financial system that make the
system vulnerable to crises and undermine its ability to
provide efficient intermediation between suppliers of credit
and organizations and individuals seeking credit. Accord-
ingly, and given the sector’s real-life importance, improv-
ing the financial system is high on political agenda’s
worldwide. Following the debate highlighting the finance
industry’s culture as one of the chief culprits in the GFC,
many pundits have thereby proposed cultural change as key
to improving the financial system. Our results, in contrast,
indicate that cultural change has only limited potential to
improve the financial system. Because the culture in the
finance industry does not stand out from the culture in other
industries, it is not realistic to expect that changing the
industry’s culture would somehow lead to a drastic
reduction in malfeasance by employees working in the
sector. Instead, it makes more sense for financial reforms to
target formal governance structures and regulations in the
industry, as these apparently leave a lot of room for dis-
honesty and unethical behavior more broadly. Our analysis
thus contributes an important practical insight, which is
that attention should shift away from cultural change
toward other types of financial sector reforms that promise
to be much more potent in improving the financial system.
A second contribution of this paper comes in the form of
the novel method for assessing organizational culture that
we have developed. Focusing on relationships between
employees’ personal traits and their career success in the
industry or organization under study, this method differs
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substantially from traditional approaches to measuring
organizational culture. This difference, in turn, has both
advantages and disadvantages. The method’s most
notable advantages are its wide applicability—all that is
required are data on personal traits and work outcomes—
and the fact that it is indirect, which provides shielding
from different types of (response) biases. A first, practical
disadvantage is that the method is data intensive, requiring
detailed information on both personal traits and work
outcomes for a large group of employees. A second, con-
ceptual disadvantage is that our ex-post method does not
clearly delineate what exactly it is about industries or
organizations, which is driving the observed differences in
the relationship between employees’ personal traits and
their career success. We have taken these differences as
reflecting differences in organizational culture. However,
strictly speaking, these differences could also be reflecting
differences in, for instance, organizational climate. For the
purpose of this paper, nothing is lost by not explicitly
distinguishing between culture and climate as both are
concerned with describing organizational environments
and, at any rate, are strongly related (Denison, 1996).
Nevertheless, future research may work on thinking about
how conceptually distinct elements of organizational
environments may get expressed in relationships between
different sets of personal traits and employee outcomes.
More generally, we think that our indirect approach to
assessing organizational culture needs further development
before it can realize its full potential as a valuable addition
to the existing toolkit for studying organizational cultures,
especially when other methods are likely to elicit biased
information from the employees concerned. A particularly
interesting and important topic for future research is to
theorize on the set of interrelationships between employee
traits and outcomes that can be combined as a way of
providing a comprehensive characterization of organiza-
tions’ culture (or climate for that matter). Extant frame-
works of organizational culture have identified a variety of
different dimensions of organizational culture, and it would
be interesting to relate features of organizations’ culture
expressed in trait–outcome relationships to the cultural
dimensions identified in such earlier work.
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